50 years ago, just one submarine changed the course of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war

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During World War II, submarines were used extensively and caused devastating damage among belligerents. However, it will be twenty-six years after the end of WWII before another submarine kills (and since then only two ships have sunk enemy ships; the other being the nuclear-powered HMS Conqueror who sank the ARA General Belgrano during the Falklands War in 1982). This December 9 marks the fiftieth anniversary of this submarine killed in a lesser-known war, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which began in the context of the Bangladesh Liberation War. On December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched surprise airstrikes on India, starting a new war between the two South Asian powers.

The geographic location of West and East Pakistan necessitated Pakistan’s control of the sea lines of communication, as East and West Pakistan are separated by 1,000 miles of Indian territory. All supplies and transport of troops to East Pakistan from West Pakistan had to be carried out by sea. India knew this and sought to ban Pakistan’s sea crossing by carrying out a surprise attack, Operation Trident., on the Karachi naval base on the night of December 4. The Indian Navy’s missile boat successfully destroyed a Pakistani destroyer and damaged a few other ships. Following this, the Indian Navy launched a second attack in Karachi on the night of December 8, Operation Phyton, which destroyed the Pakistani Navy’s main fuel depot and sank three merchant ships.

Knowing that it could not compete with the Indian Navy, the Pakistani Navy sought to disrupt Indian Navy operations in East Pakistan (Bay of Bengal) and West Pakistan (Arabian Sea) by sending its small fleet of two submarines. They sent the aging WWII submarine PNS Ghazi in the Bay of Bengal to locate and sink the Indian Navy’s only aircraft carrier, the INS Vikrant. SNP Ghazi managed to sneak into the Bay of Bengal and alarm the Indian Navy ships. Massive anti-submarine research was launched which diverted valuable naval resources to search for PNS Ghazi. The aging Pakistani submarine, however, has been mysteriously lost in the Bay of Bengal.

Meanwhile, in the West Pakistan Theater, PNS Hanger, who was already at sea when the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War broke out on December 3, was redeployed to search and destroy as well as disrupt Indian Navy operations in the Arabian Sea. SNP Hanger was a French construction Daphne– diesel-electric submarine class. With its surface naval fleet nearly destroyed or deactivated by attacks from India on the nights of December 4-8, the Pakistani navy had to rely on its only submarine operating in the Arabian Sea to disrupt Indian operations.

SNP Hanger walked the coast from Bombay and made contact with an Indian naval flotilla, but was unable to position themselves for a viable attack. Nevertheless, the Indian flotilla had detected the presence of a submarine and taken avoidance measures as well as anti-submarine actions. This Indian flotilla was in fact heading for another sneak attack in Karachi on the night of December 5. The presence of the PNS Hanger disrupted the operation and dispersed the Indian Navy ships, ultimately canceling their attack on Karachi. Despite rigorous anti-submarine actions undertaken by Indian ships, PNS Hanger managed to slip away and continued his combat patrol.

SNP Hanger subsequently established further contact with two Indian Navy ships on the morning of December 9 off the coast of Kathiawar. She detected the ships with her sonar and realized that they were two frigates performing anti-submarine maneuvers, most likely looking for her. SNP Hanger tracked down Indian Navy frigates while taking evasive action. On the evening of December 9, PNS Hanger managed to position himself in the path of the frigates undetected and launched a torpedo attack. At three minutes before 8 p.m., PNS Hangor fired a homing torpedo but missed. A second torpedo was fired, and this time it found its mark by hitting the Indian frigate INS Khurkri. The second frigate, INS Kirkan closed on PNS Hanger‘s position resulting in PNS Hanger hurrying out of the area but not before firing Parthian fire, firing a third torpedo at the INS Kirkan, who managed to escape the torpedo. INS Kirkan then canceled his sub hunt and returned instead to save the INS by Khukri crew, but were only able to save a few. INS Khukri, his magazines hit him, sank in two minutes and almost his entire strength of eighteen officers and 176 men, including the captain, sank with him. This was the biggest loss of Indian military personnel during the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war.

Follow the PNS Hanger, a massive submarine hunt was carried out by the Indian Navy involving surface ships, planes and helicopters. The sub-chase succeeded in dispersing and hijacking Indian Navy ships. A third attack on the port of Karachi, dubbed Operation Triumph, which was scheduled for the night of December 10, had to be canceled due to the sub-hunting as well as the risk posed by the lurking submarine. There would be no more naval attacks on Karachi from that night. The Indian Navy canceled its sub-hunt on December 13. PNS Hanger managed to escape the sub-hunters and successfully returned to Karachi on December 18, two days after the end of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War.

The strategic effect of the PNS HangerThe actions of, although not spectacular in terms of the number or tonnage of sunken ships, caused immense psychological fear and created consequences far greater than the weight of its torpedoes. The sinking of the INS Khukri in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War had forced the Indian Navy to cancel a crucial attack on the port of Karachi as well as to divert and disperse valuable naval resources to search and sink the PNS Hanger. The fact that an enemy submarine had just successfully sunk a frigate and hid in the Arabian Sea was more than enough to fuel fears of further submarine attacks, which led to an intense anti operation. -submarine.

While many nations today seek to build a small submarine force, this isolated submarine action fifty years ago testifies that even a single submarine, if used judiciously, can still produce effects. important strategic plans well above its tonnage.

Dr Adam Leong Kok Wey is Professor of Strategic Studies and Deputy Director of Research at the Center for Defense and International Security Studies (CDISS) at the National Defense University of Malaysia. His latest book is Strategy and Special Operations: Eastern and Western Perspectives published by NDUM Press (2021).

Image: Reuters.

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